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This paper analyzes the pattern of Argentine economic
development from the mid -nineteenth century until the present
day. Initially, an overview of the Argentine developmental
experience is given, emphasizing the three general phases of
Argentine economic development - 1) agricultural export
dominance, 2) industrialization through import substitution,
and 3) the present state of cyclical economic crises and
domestic instability. Secondly, the phases of development
are examined from an economic viewpoint to determine their
cumulative effects upon the Argentine economic structure.
Finally, a model of Argentine "self-sufficiency" based on
input -output analysis is presented as a point of departure
for future developmental planning.
The results of the analysis point out the basic problems
behind the present-day Argentine developmental structure
and demonstrate the interactions of the various phases in
their contribution to the existing cyclical instability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To the student of economic development,
whether from the standpoint of theory or poli-
cy, the experience of Argentina offers an in-
teresting object lesson . . o the case of
Argentina presents a striking contrast between
the ambitious scale on which development pro-
grams have been formulated and the singular
lack of foresight with which the basic problems
of the economy have been approached by the
.
State. 1
The intent of this paper is to examine the course of
Argentine development, from both a historical and theoretical
point of view, and analyze the roots and stages of the Argen-
tine developmental problem . Chapter II presents an overview
of Argentina, beginning with a brief description of its phy-
sical attributes and then going on to a discussion of the
interactions of economic and human forces and policies and
their bearing on the developmental path of Argentina from
the 19th century to the present.
Chapter III examines the theoretical aspects of the
developmental pattern and analyzes the effects of the various
industrial policies brought about by import substitution on
the Argentine economy. Beginning with a basic analysis of
trade theory, policies regarding protection, exports, and
industrialization are discussed.
Raul Prebisch, "The Structural Crisis in Argentina and
Its Prospects of Solution," in Economic Growth
,
ed. Eastin
Nelson, (Austin: University of Texas Press, I960), 104.

Chapter IV uses the techniques of input-ouput analysis
to determine the structure of the Argentine economy if it
were to attain a state of seif-suff iciency c The analysis
focuses on the sectoral strengths and weaknesses of the
Argentine economy, thereby providing a starting point for
developmental progress.
This paper is not meant to cure all of the problems of
Argentina's economic development with one simple solution.
The problems of economic development in any country are much
too complex to be solved in such a manner „ Argentina is not
an ideal nation with ideally economic problems. Therefore,
this paper attempts to examine a total picture of the Argentine
national development pattern since the mid-nineteenth century
and analyze some of the problems encountered Following
this, a point of departure for future developmental analysis
is discussed--not as a total solution, but as one means of
analyzing the economic structure of the Argentine economy.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF ARGENTINA
A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
1. Physical
Argentina, with an area of approximately 2,776,656
2
Km,, (over one million square miles), covers about one sixth
2
of the South American continent « As shown in the maps in
Appendix A, Argentina is a land of geographical contrasts.
2
Of the total land area of Argentina, about 300,000 km.
2
(over ten percent) are arable, another 1,113,000 km. per-
2
manent meadows and pastures, about 994,000 km. forest land,
2 3
and 353,000 km useless mountain wasteland.
The area below the Colorado River is known as Pata-
gonia, covering about one-fourth of the national area but
containing less than three percent of the population. Used
mainly for large sheep ranches, there are some small coal
and petroleum deposits which are undeveloped due to poor
transport facilities and their distance from the population
centers
.
The Andean Northwest region covers another one-fourth
of the national area, with its Piedmont area second in importance
2Argentina
,
(Inter-American Development Bank, 1969), 99.
3
J. P. Cole, Latin America: An Economic and Social Geo -
graphy, (London: Butterworth and Co., 1965), 382.
Ben G. Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, Political F rces
in Latin America: Dimensien 5 of the Quest for S cabil ,





to the pampas region in importance. The Piedmont produces
wine and contains small coal and petroleum deposits. Out-
side of the Piedmont, the Northwest region consists of
Andean foothills and plateaus containing dry, clay-filled,
sandy basins and volcanic debris --all considered to be un-
productive.
The Northeast region contains tropical lowland plains
called the Gran Chaco, and fertile prairie soil in the Meso-
potamian area between the Uruguay and Parana Rivers . The
Gran Chaco is sparsely settled, having many of the character-
istics of a tropical rain forest. A few tea plantations are
located there cultivating the popular yerba mate tea. Also,
the hardwood quebracho is commercially important as a source
for tanning extracts, railroad ties, and high-grade charcoal.
The Mesopotamian area contains layers of topsoil twenty feet
thick which are flooded during the rainy season. This area
will become more important as the marginal cultivation value
of the Pampas lands declines and new areas are developed to
replace the over-cultivated soilo
The remaining and most important region of Argentina is
the Pampas region, a fertile plain extending from the capital
city of Buenos Aires in a rough semi-circle with a 500-mile
radius „ The southern sector is devoted to high-grade cattle
raising, the western sector to the growth of wheat and alfalfa,
Frederick P. Munson, et. al
.
, Area Handbook for Argen-






and the northeastern sector nearest Buenos Aires to supplying
the capital city with fruits, vegetables, and dairy products.
The Pampas contains 88 percent of the cultivated land and 70
percent of the beef cattle raised in the nation» Comprising
almost one-third of the national area, the Pampas contains
about three-fourths of the population and about 90 percent
of the national industrial product
»
2. Population
The population of Argentina, estimated at about
8
24,352,000 in 1970, has more of the characteristics of a
Western European nation than one from Latin America. Almost
completely "white" due to the Spanish colonial killing of the
natives, any remaining Indians or mestizos were almost
completely absorbed by the millions of European immigrants
who came over during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Argentina's population growth rate of about 1„6 per-
9
cent between 1960 and 1970 is one of the lowest in the world.
This may be due to a decline in the nation's birth rate from
22.5 to 22 „3 births per thousand from 1961 to 1967, 1 and
improving health conditions which lowered the infant mortality
Ben G« Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson, op . cit , 394.
8
Argentina , op „ cit .
9
Ibid .
America En Cifras 1970: Situacion Demografics
,
(Wash-
ington: Organization of American States , 1970) , 118.

rate from 59.1 deaths per thousand births in 1961 to 58.3
in 1967, thus allowing the expected life span of an Argentine
12
born in 1967 to be 66.3 years.
Educationally, Argentina's population had a literacy
13
rate of 91.5 percent in 1960, with over two-thirds of the
population of school-aged children attending primary school
14
and one-fifth attending secondary school. The average
Argentine receives 3 9 years of formal schooling as compared
to 2 2 years for all of Latin America.
The occupational distribution of the population is
reflected by its rural-urban dwelling concentration. In 1960
72 o 6 percent of the population lived in an urban location,
16
while 27 o4 percent were located rurally. Of the 52.9
percent of the economically-active population (7,599,000
17
persons) over ten years of age in 1960, about 30 percent were
engaged in agricultural occupations, with the others engaged
in industrial, commercial, or service occupations, as shown
in Table I. This urbanized locational structure has led to
America En Cifras 1970 : Situacion Demografica , op.
cit o , 174.
12Argentina , op . cit . , 99.
13T...Ibid .
14
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18Tenencia de la Tierra y Reforma Aeraria en Amer ic
Latina
,
op cit c , 5^T9
11

the growth of an established, active middle class, as shown
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The existence of such a middle class, amounting to
approximately 38 percent of the Argentine social structure,
19Ben G. Burnett and Harry F. Johnson, op. cit, , 396.
12

again lends to the overall appearance of the Argentine
structure resembling a fairly stable, European nation rather
than the under -developed, unstable nation that it is,
B. ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO 1929
1 The 19th Century Developmental Environment
Argentina, as shown in the preceding section, is a
country with untapped resources, vast agricultural potential,
room for its population to expand, a controlled rate of pop-
ulation growth, and a fairly literate and socially dispersed
citizenry which is adapted to urbanization and industrializa-
tion,, Why Argentina has continued to remain a stagnant,
underdeveloped nation trapped in cycles of economic and
political instability can be attributed to the 19th century
roots of initial Argentine development.
During the 19th century a pattern of growth through
trade developed between the industrialising center nations
of Europe and the peripheral, primary commodity supplying
nations such as Argentina. As stated by Nurkse:
The focal center of economic expansion was
initially Great Britain . . Q The industrial
revolution happened to originate on a small island
with a limit ad range of natural resources at a
time when synthetic materials were yet unknown.
In these circumstances, economic expansion was
transmitted to less developed areas by a steep
and steady increase in Britain's demand for pri-
mary commodities which those areas were well
suited to produce o Local factors of production
overseas „ • » were thus largely absorbed by the
expansion of profitable primary production for
export o » o This pattern of "growth through trade"
13

affected particularly the new countries . . » in
the world's temporate latitudes: Canada, Argentina,
Australia, Uruguay, South Africa, New Zealand.
^
u
Thus, the 19th century international economic situation
saw primary goods being supplied from the new, less-developed
areas to the older, increasingly industrialized areas. How-
ever, the export expansion alone did not determine which of
the lesser developed countries would prosper from the new
demand
:
... Growth where it occurred was mainly the
consequence of favorable internal factors, and
external demand represented an added stimulus
which varied in importance from country to country
and period to period
„
Latin American nations thus entered the 19th century trade
arena during the 1840' s, exporting products according to
both internal factors and external demand stimulus. They
tended to be classified in three groups according to their
internal commodities available for export:
. o o The primary exporters involved in this
process tended to fall into three groups: a)
countries exporting temporate agricultural com-
modities; b) countries exporting tropical
agricultural commodities; and c) countries
exporting mineral products. In each case,




Ragnar Nurkse, Patterns of Trade and Development
,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 14-15.
21
L. B. Kravis , "Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth:
Similarities Between the Nineteenth and the Twentieth
Centuries," in The Economic Journal
, LXXX, (December 1970),
850.
22
Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin Am a_,
(Cambridge: University Press, 1970), oI~. "
14

Argentina and Uruguay essentially comprised the
temperate agricultural commodity exporters, basing their pro-
duction on the extensive use of land so as to compete directly
with the home use of land in the industrializing nations and
gaining fairly high profits initially as the developed nations
transferred their agricultural technology to the peripheral
suppliers The volume of agricultural production necessitated
the creation of transportation systems within the supplying
nations, orienting their domestic markets toward the major
23
ports of shipment (i.e., the Buenos Aires area). Thus, by
their competitive, direct interaction with the European
industrial nations, the temperate producers were able to
achieve a very high rate of growth during the 19th and early
20th centuries
o
2 The Argentine Experience
Argentina came to prominence in the international
market after the fall of the dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas
in. 1852 and the enactment of the Constitution of 1853. The
development of the Argentine Pampas region began with the con-
struction of the first Argentine railway, the Ferrocarr
1
1 del
Oeste , in 1857--financed wholly by Argentine capital and ope-
2k
rated by Argentines. The further development of the railroad
system and the refrigerator ships from Europe were chiefly
23
Celso Furtado, cp_ cit . , 32-33.
2k . .
Tomas Roberto Fillol, Social Factors in Economic
Development; The Argentine Case
,




responsible for the vast development of the Argentine interior
which followed during the remainder of the century „ As
stated by Ferrer:
Argentina's participation in an expanding
world market during the second half of the nine-
teenth century was based on the growth of its
agricultural and livestock exports. This en-
abled the country to increase its payments to
the rest of the world, both for imports of goods
and services and for meeting external debt com-
mitments «, o o the expansion of exports was
possible for two main reasons. First, due to the
increasing integration of the world economy,
world demand for agricultural and livestock
products from the temperate zones soared. Second,
large tracts of fertile land were available in
the Pampa that were either untouched or only
partially exploited.
Between 1857 and 1914 Argentina received a total of
3,300,000 immigrants from Europe, 90 percent of which
settled in the Pampas region. This growth in population,
while by no means. fully settling the region, contributed to
a considerable increase in export output during the period.
However, this massive influx of immigrants also laid the
foundations for the constant political instability which has
plagued Argentine development to the present day. Such a
velocity of growth caused social transformation to occur in
an unguided, spontaneous manner Q Most of the immigrants came
from countries in southern Europe where political participation
was generally unheard of, thus they lacked knowledge and
desire for a cohesive political system. The existing Argentine
25Aldo Ferrer, The Argentine Economy
,
(Berkeley: Uni-





elite began to detest the immigrants and further block them
27
from political participation.
Due to the ownership of existing Pampas land by a
handful of the Argentine elite, the influx of immigrants
tended to create rapid urbanization without industrial
development in the urban centers The lack of available land
tended to hold back rural development, as less than 25 percent
of the immigrants went into farming activities. By 1914,
although 42 7 percent of the population was foreign born,
28
less than ten percent of the immigrants were property owners.
This concentration of land ownership created a social elite
which emphasized not the creation of an integrated society,
but allowed each individual to stress his own life-style with
little governmental or national allegiance - the roots of the
29political instability still prevalent today.
During this period, foreign investment in Argentina
reached ten billion dollars in present-day purchasing power,
which amounted to 8.5 percent of all foreign investment
carried out by the industrializing nations from 1860 to 1913
,
33 percent of all foreign investment in Latin America, and 42
percent of Great Britain's investments in Latin America.
2
'Manwoo Lee, "Argentine Political Instability," in
Journal of Inter-American Studies
, XI, (October 1969), 561.
28Aldo Ferrer, op_ cit., 98.
29
Manwoo Lee, op_ cit . , 561.
30
Aldo Ferrer, op_o cit. , 89.
17

With the high dependence on agricultural exports and
the foreign investment injected into Argentina, the elite power
structure pursued free trade policies which inhibited the
growth of domestic industry needed to integrate the economy.
Exports during this period amounted to between 50 and 70 per-
cent of the agricultural and livestock output of the Pampas
region, the volume of which at any one time depended on the
foreign demand for the products which in turn depended on the
level of production in the industrialized countries . Thus,
Argentine exports and the internal economy rose and fell with
31
the phases of the business cycles in Europe. Such domestic
conditions resulted often in high rates of inflation, which
the power structure endorsed as a means for increased export
32 . •
earnings o
. Thus, excessive dependence on foreign exchange was
introduced from the beginning of Argentine development. Exports
and foreign investment were the two keys to the primary stage
of development, which made domestic employment, balance of
payments, and public finance extremely vulnerable to inter-
national market conditions „ Wages, rents, profits, and
interest depended directly on the export level With high
export earnings , both agricultural income and employment rose
to meet increased demand. The increased agricultural income
helped to increase the employment and earnings in the
31
Aldo Ferrer, op_<, clt , , 102-103.
32
Tomas Roberto Fillol, op_ c cit . , *+3
18

non-agricultural sector through a multiplier effect, depending
on the propensity of the rural demand for imported goods over
domestic goods Conversely, when export earnings dropped,
the entire economy experienced a contraction of demand leading
33
to unemployment in all sectors,,
Balance of payments equilibrium also depended on
export levels, with imports generally increasing as export
demand increased. Whenever a payments deficit occurred, foreign
investment was generally sufficient to make up the gap during
this period o However, the balance of payments equilibrium
was extremely tenuous during this period, foretelling of
conditions to come.
In the area of public finance, the government resorted
on a large scale to foreign loans, through the issue of bonds
on the international capital market, with external debt two
to four times the current fiscal revenues and interest com-
mitments fixed in terms of gold which had to be met regard-
less of the Argentine fiscal situation,. When exports revenues
were high, the debt interest amounted to about 20 percent of
government revenues, but when exports slumped, the interest
35
reached 60 percent or more of the government revenue intake.
Thus, the public financial structure was also extremely de-
pendent on the international market conditions and often held











together by sharp curtailment of public expenditures, such as
armed forces' and public employees' salaries „ However, as in
the balance of payments structure, adjustment mechanisms via
increased export earnings alleviated the situation before a
.36
serious crisis point.
Therefore, the foundations of political instability
and foreign exchange dependence were created during the primary
export period of Argentine development, extending from the
1850 's through the 1920' s until the depression period of the
1930'
s
Agricultural export dependence created a power elite
which disaffected the immigrant population and discouraged
the development of domestic industry and a balanced economy,,
G. THE DEPRESSION PERIOD AND THE PERON ERA
1, The Impact of the Depression
The impact of the 1929 world-wide economic crisis
assumed catastrophic proportions in Latin America as a whole
because of its extreme dependence on external trade. Argentina
was hit relatively less severely than the others due to the
low income elasticity of demand of the industrial countries
for temperate-zone agricultural products „ Also, these pro-
ducts were fairly elastic in supply, due to their seasonal
nature and the ability to cut back on production from one year
to another o Argentina was actually able to improve its terms
of trade through a reduction in exports and aid its balance of




payments as a result of a reduced capacity to import «,
Internally, the Depression caused a structural shift
in the Argentine economy:
o . . The dominance of the agricultural sector
was shaken by the three main features of the
depression—stoppage of capital movement, falling
commodity prices, and a shrinkage of international
trade volume . As part of its defense of the Argen-
tine economy, the conservative government of the
thirties undertook policies which thrust the
agricultural sector into a coalition with the
small industrial sector
«
This abrupt shift in emphasis with regard to industry
was a natural occurrence. Before 1930 the agricultural sec-
tor stood to lose from increased domestic demand for its
products due to unsatisfied external demand «, After 1930, how-
ever, the foreign demand was drastically reduced and agricul-
ture stood to gain from increased internal demando Thus, the
government acted in a manner foreshadowing the eventual
policies of import substitution: expansionary fiscal policy,
investment in the industrial infrastructure, tariff increases,
currency devaluations , negative terms of trade movements for
agricultural products internally, and exchange discrimination
39
against imports
Between 1935 and 1946, when Peron took office, the
number of manufacturing establishments increased by 60 percent,
37
Celso Furtado, op_. cit . , 40-41.
38
.Gilbert W. Merkx, "Sectoral Clashes and Political
Change: The Argentine Experience," in Latin American Research
Review





and the number of industrial workers and employees increased
by 83 percent. By 1946 the industrial labor force made up
40
17 percent of the economically active population,,
2» The Peron Era
During the Second World War and immediately there-
after, Argentina accumulated a substantial level of foreign
exchange reserves » The rise of Juan Peron to power during
1945 and 1946 was based on the resurgence of prosperity during
the war years as well as the strength and hopes of the new
industrial sector:
Peron' s regime was based on heroic feats in
a society characterized by lack of community, in-
judicious political actions, a propensity for
generating intransigence, lack of confidence and
trust, and disputed authorities . . . Peron'
s
authority rested on his appeal to equality, which
involved the participation of the masses . •
. As a manifestation of the above political tactics,
the Peron government dedicated itself to the economic develop-
ment of Argentina through industrialization, a complete reversal
of past traditions o The Five Point Plan of October 21, 1946,
was a heroic act calling for the following governmental
actions: 1) government holdings of foreign currency were to
be used to retire the foreign debt or purchase foreign hold-
ings; 2) foreign investments in the infrastructure (especially
in transportation and power) were nationalized through purchase;
3) state-owned corporations were established to replace foreign
40Gilbert W„ Merkx , op_„ cit „ , 90,





holdings or to stimulate new operations; 4) control of credit,
foreign trade, and exchange was greatly expanded; and 5) such
economic tools were used to actively foster import substitution
42
by the industrial sector.
The above policy, while politically popular with the
industrial sector, was not well thought-out:
The policy of import-substituting indus-
trialization during 1943-55 was not an integrated
and thought-out plan Rather, it seemed to pro-
ceed from one improvisation to another, reacting
to short-run economic and political pressures.
At the end of the war <> the main preoccupation
was defending those industries which had arisen ^3
during the previous years, regardless of efficiency
„
The Peron government's loans to industry expanded three
times as rapidly as those to agriculture between 1946 and
1948, while further assistance was given through a system of
extreme protection,, High tariffs coupled with a system of
quotas and a grossly over-valued peso combined to subsidize
industry, stagnate agricultural exports, and discourage any
possible industrial exports. Peron' s policies severely
suppressed agricultural output, so that investment in agri-
44
culture was reduced to a point even below that of the 1930 ! s.
Table I in Appendix B shows the agricultural decline through
the bias developed in the internal terms of trade against
rural goods.
42Gilbert W. Merkx , 0£ cit , , 92-93.
Carlos F. Diaz -Alejandro, "An Interpretation of
Argentine Economic Growth Since 1930, Part II," in Journal of
Development Studies , III, (January 1967), 158.
44 .
^Gilbert W. Merkx , op_ c cijb , 94-95 a
23

The suppression of the agricultural export sector made
short-run political sense in that it pleased Peron' s supporters,
the industrial sector. However, it soon led to a severe
foreign exchange crisis in 1949. With the contraction of
agricultural investment, the export income of Argentina was
gradually reduced to where it could no longer cover the
intensive importation of intermediate goods needed for the in-
dustrial development program. With the occurrence of a severe
drought in 1949, a sharp contraction in agricultural export
earnings occurred and industrial progress was brought to a
halt. Machinery and equipment for the construction of new
45
plant capacity could neither be manufactured nor bought.
Peron was caught between internal export stagnation and
external foreign exchange constraints., Having promoted in-
dustry at the expense of agriculture, the industrialization
process brought increased wages to laborers enabling them to
consume potential export products, such as beef. Peron could
not lower the industrial wages for obvious political reasons,
and substitution programs to induce the populace to eat chicken
or fish in place of beef failed. If he extended increased
funds to the agricultural sector at the expense of industry
in order to improve export performance, Peron risked alienating
his political support. An invitation to foreign investors
to invest in Argentina would have violated the nationalist
aura of his regime, as would the negotiation of foreign loans.
45





Thus, the Peron government was caught by the sectoral coa-
46
lition which brought it to power.
Nevertheless, the Peron government experimented with
all of the above methods » In 1949, import restrictions were
tried; in 1950, a $150 million loan was negotiated with the
United States; in 1951, an austerity program was attempted with
a sharp drop in the real wages of labor brought about; in
1952, following another severe foreign exchange crisis, the
peso was devalued and agricultural support increased. 1953
and 1954 brought a fairly strong recovery, but as industrial
production increased, the foreign exchange bottleneck appeared
to check all further progress and a recession had begun by
47
1955 „ Tables II and IV in Appendix B show the balance of
payments and export earnings cycles during the Peron govern-
ment period,,
During this period Argentina was also hit with severe
inflationary problems
:
Inflation has been a problem of major impor-
tance since the late 1940'
s
Q During the early
years of the Peron administration, the government
kept such tendencies in check by subsidizing
major food products and important nationally
produced raw materials. . <, the ample foreign
exchange resources made it possible to import
large quantities of goods, which also served to
keep price increases in check
However, by 1949, Argentina's foreign ex-
change reserves had been largely exhausted.
. . prices began to rise rapidly. The upshot
of the inflation during the latter years of the
Peron administration was a fall in the real wages







of Argentine workers „ . „ . By the time Peron
was overthrown, in 1955, . „ . the real wage
tended to be even less than that in 1943.^°
Thus, beset by political disaffection and economic in-
tability, the Peron government was overthrown by a military
oup in 1955 and a provisional government set up. Politically,
his was almost inevitable due to the Peronist style of
overnment
:
Peron's success, if any, remained largely
psychological rather than substantial. He stimu-
lated the excitable masses but failed to organize
and structure them His government was a highly
personal one lacking a true revolutionary faith
for transforming the nation. Peron's decisions
and policies were not guided by political realities
but by fantasies and emotions . a . Though Peron
elevated the status of the masses «, . . he divided
the nation into two irreconcilable camps: Peronist
and anti-Peronist o Neither was strong enough to
destroy the other, nor humble enough to live with
the other* This situation literally ruined the
country
.
The economic legacy of the Peron regime is summed up
s follows
... The Corporate state' mentality of the
Peron. regime had resulted in an economy with a
very low capacity to transform, where producers
and consumers expected the government to shield
them from any undesirable trends which could
arise from the market. More and more the price
mechanism became a tool to redistribute income
rather than to allocate resources » . . The
system of protection which had been used to
stimulate most branches of manufacturing not
only contributed to create quasi-monopolistic
positions in the domestic market, but it also
48
Robert J. Alexander, An Introduction to Argentina
,
New York: Frederick A e Praeger Publishers, 1969), 78-79.
49
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drastically increased, but to no avail. Inflation and foreign
51
exchange problems continued to mount during the period.
President Arturo Frondizi emerged to take control in
1958 and immediately embarked on a program of domestic
austerity, agricultural balance, and foreign loans to help
ease the economic crises o Argentina received U. S. $48.5
million from the World Bank for highway development and U, S.
$100 million credit from the U» S« Export-Import Bank and
52
energy resource development. Unfortunately, Frondizi was
unable to prevent another foreign exchange crisis which led
to another industrial development bottleneck in 1962.
Politically disliked by both Peronistas and anti-Peronistas
,
Frondizi 's regime was unable to maintain an effective mechanism
of command, the insubordination and the multiplication of




2. The Illia Regime
President Arturo I Ilia inherited power in 1963 during
an upturn in the Argentine economic cycle, with bumper grain
crops and newly-opened trade with the Communist-bloc nations
giving the balance of payments a slight surplus',, Industrialization
increased, soon creating a foreign exchange deficit due to
Robert J. Alexander, op_ cit . , 80.




(Los Angeles: Latin American Center, 1967), 21.
53Manwoo Lee, op_. cit . , 569.
28

the necessity to import intermediate goods for the indus-
trial program, Illia was deposed by the military which once
54
supported him in June of 1966.
3. The Ongahia Regime
General Juan Carlos Ongania succeeded Illia in 1967,
after a six month junta rule, and attempted a program of
price stabilization through the freezing of credit, prices,
wages, and the limitation of government expenditures. Met
by considerable union resistance, the government program pre-
vailed and succeeded in achieving some retardation of the
inflation rate by the end of 1967. However, the Ongania
regime, like those before it, ran into the same cycle of
"stop-go" development brought about by a shortage of foreign
exchange. While industrial exports to other Latin American
countries increased from U.S. $60 million in 1966 to U.S. $209
million in 1969, the overall balance of payments situation
swung from a surplus of U. S. $250 million in 1966 to a
deficit of U.S. $266 million by 1969. From 196 9 through
the first three quarters of 1970, agricultural production
grew due to increased internal demand and favorable prices,
but the growth soon turned into a cost-of-living increase as
internal market demand exceeded the 5.9 percent agricultural
56
increase o Ongania was replaced in 1971
„
Frederick P. Munson, c_p_. cit
. , 254.
Robert J Alexander, £p_. cit
.
, 82.
Argentina, o_p_ cit . , 101-102.
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ko The Lanusse Regime
Alejandro Lanusse, the present incumbent president
of Argentina, succeeded General Ongafiia in the summer of 1971.
Stepping into an unstable political and economic situation,
his finance ministers have been trying to arrange for a U. S.
$1 billion loan from various North American and European
sources to pay off Argentina's external debts o In order to
get the loan, the Lanusse government must take steps to limit
the high rate of internal inflation which plagued the country
in 1971 o At the end of 1971, Lanusse took some action in that
direction by limiting wage increases for 1972 to 25 percent,
an increase well below the projected possible inflation rate
of k5 percent. This action immediately set off a wave of
strikes by pro-Peronist forces who want the old leader to
return to power from his exile in Spain.
Lanusse is in a precarious position. His electoral
platform is based on promises to maintain the real value of
wages while promoting a faster rate of economic growth. -^ith
private domestic investment at a standstill, public investment
and deficit financing seem to be the only answers. Since
effective exchange controls have proven unworkable in the past,
such policies may create a foreign exchange crisis through
58
increased demand for imported goods.
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Latin America
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Prognostications for the immediate future of the
Lanusse regime hinge upon his ability to control the inflation
rate, balance the foreign exchange deficit, and keep his
political backing from both the Peron backers and the armed
forces „ He has stated to his armed forces leaders that he
feels it is impossible to implement a program of monetary
stabilization and that a system of exchange control would not
be introduced for fear of upsetting the international financiers
from which the loan is being sought. On the positive side, the
Fiat Corporation has promised to invest $90 million in Argentina
over the next four years in automobile production, and
59
Citroen and Olivetti have followed suit.
Politically, Lanusse seems to have reached some sort
of agreement with the Peronist movement, who were counselled
by Peron himself to avoid fresh confrontations with the
government over wage controls. This holds out the possibility
of some inflation control, the procurement of the needed loans,
60
and appeasement of armed forces elements
«
Thus, the Lanusse regime is caught up in the political-
economic cycle of instability which has plagued Argentina
for the past thirty years. Whether it will be more success-
ful than its predecessors remains to be seen, but the odds
are against it.
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The economic development of Argentina has, since its
nineteenth century beginnings, been dominated by and dependent
upon its external relations with the rest of the world. This
dependence initially took the form of primary temperate zone
agricultural exports to the industrializing nations of Europe
from about 1857 to 1929, during which patterns of political
instability and agricultural dominance were formed. Economic
policies, both internal and external, were determined by the
international marketplace and the current export prices <,
With the coming of the depression during the 1930 T s, the
contraction of external demand for agricultural products
forced the agricultural power structure to actively foster
domestic industrialization, which it had previously suppressed
in order to maintain maximum export revenues. With the coming
to power of Juan Peron in 1946, an active policy of indus-
trialization through import substitution was followed, and the
industrial sector became the political power force determining
national policy. Emphasis on industrialization led to agri-
cultural stagnation and a shortage of foreign exchange needed
to import intermediate goods necessary for the industrialization
process. This, plus a protection policy which forced industry
to use only high-priced domestic materials caused inflationary
price rises which were followed by wage increases in a never-
ending cycle which aggravated the foreign exchange balance
further. Thus, industrial development was always out short
by the foreign exchange bottleneck in a never-ending ser:: s
of "stop-go' 1 cycles.
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The ruinous economic cycles have continued through five
political regimes since Peron's ouster in 1955. Both military
and civilian, every new president up through the present
time has had to cope with the "stop-go" syndrome, losing
power whenever curative actions either became too harsh for
the vested labor-industrial interests or too non-progressive
for the armed forces,, The present administration faces the
same set of economic and political constraints, with no




III. AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENT
A. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
1. Background
As described in the previous chapter, the economic
developmental path of Argentina has been highly dependent on
and determined by its external trade relations » These have
served both as agents for national growth during the initial
phase of Argentine development and as developmental con-
straints during the latter phases. The initial phase of
Argentine development was characterized by the policies of
trade through comparative advantage „ During the 19th and early
20th century development period, Argentina specialized in the
export of agricultural products to Europe in return for non-
agricultural consumer and capital goods. Each participant
was able to expand domestic consumption beyond domestic
production capacity levels through trade and specialize in




The world-wide Depression of the 1930' s upset the
international market system and reversed the policies of
Argentina toward comparative advantage and domestic industry.
With the curtailment of foreign demand for their exports , the
agricultural elite of Argentina and the government began to
See Appendix C for a discussion of comparative adv v
tage and equilibrium analysis.
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encourage industrial development as a substitute market for
their agricultural commodities. This transition is described
in a more general form below:
Development led and financed by primary
exports is the traditional colonial strategy
and one followed by many noncolonial countries
blessed with rich natural resources.. . . the
primary exporters have relatively high imports
... Industry is typically lower than normal
and primary production significantly higher
o • • Sound development by this route eventually
requires a country to become less dependent on
primary exports and shift towards a more balanced
production and trade structure „ . . A smooth
transition is fairly exceptional, however, since
most countries delay the needed structural change
until demand for their primary export declines.
Industrialization is held by some to be of paramount
concern to the development of the peripheral nations, as stated
in the following:
o . . As the spread of technical progress into
the periphery ---limited originally to exports of
primary commodities and related activities-- is
advancing more and more into other sectors, it
brings with it the need for industrialization.
Indeed, industrialization is an inescapable
part of the process of change accompanying
a gradual improvement in per capita income • . .
Industry and technical advance in primary pro-
duction are thus complementary aspects of the
same process o And in this process, industry
plays a dynamic role, not only in inducing
technical progress in primary and other activi-
ties, but in the new attitudes fostered by
industrial development.^
f\ 9
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2 . The Process of Import Substitution
Initially, industrialization occurs in the primary-
commodity exporting nations through the evolution of a nucleus
of industries producing non-durable consumer goods such as
textiles, leather goods, and processed foods in response to
increased domestic demand for such goods resulting from in-
creased domestic disposable income from an expansion in
export sales. Thus, domestic industries are initially tied
to the export sector and can gain some degree of autonomy only
by the establishment of sufficient domestic demand to make
possible profitable domestic supply at a price no higher than
the foreign supply price plus transport costs. This process
of replacing foreign goods with domestic goods is known as
64
import substitution,,
Ideally, import substitution should follow these
guidelines: 1) promote, from the start, domestic production
of consumer goods, intermediate products, and capital goods
in which the country can develop a realistic comparative
advantage; 2) lower protective tariff barriers so as not to
discriminate against capital, intermediate, or consumer goods;
3) ensure that the traditional export sector is not discri-
minated against by the industrial sector; and 4) determine
the size and the timing of the import substitution strategy
on the basis of planning and a long-term industrialization
Celso Furtado, op_. cit . , 83-84.
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program that relates the balance of payments position to
65
the requirements for overall economic growth,,
Realistically, the import substitution process rarely
conforms to the above strategic guidelines. Implemented with
an array of protective quotas, credit and fiscal maneuvers,
and state-controlled corporations and development banks, im-
port substitution has been adopted throughout the past thirty
years as a response to war, depression, balance-of-payments
difficulties, a response to domestic market growth due to
export expansion, and official governmental development
66
policies o
The process is characterized by tightly separated
stages of manufacture, starting with the manufacture of
finished consumer goods which were previously imported, and
then moving on through backward linkage effects to the manu-
facture of intermediate goods and machinery. Contrary to the
industrialization process of the presently developed nations,
the import substitution process is almost wholly a matter of
imitation and importation of tried and tested industrialization
methods, consequently bringing in complex technology to the
developing nation without the sustained technological
experimentation and training in innovation which are
Jose A. Datas-Panero, "Import Substitution," in
Finance and Development
, VIII, (September 1971), 35.
Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-
Substituting Industrialization in Latin America," in The
Quarterly Journal of Economics




characteristic of the developed nations. Therefore, from
the very beginning the import substitution process tends to
set a weak foundation of imitation without innovative ex-
perience for the new industries
»
The stages of manufacture are characterized by kinked
output curves for the industries involved --rising rapidly when
foreign imports of consumer goods are being replaced by
domestic production, and then flattening out as further in-
creases in domestic demand become based on the growth of
domestic income rather than straight substitution o Industrial
profits tend to follow this same pattern, thus import -sub-
stituting industries tend to move rapidly from initial high
rates of profit and growth to a point of maturity after which
profits and industrial investment are reduced and remain fairly
constant.
This initial rapid -growth, high-profit period often
leads to unwarranted optimism among policy makers and
industrialists in the developing nation, which in turn may
lead to poorly planned actions:
o o .Nevertheless, it is probably legitimate
to speak of a particularly "easy" phase of im-
port substitution when the manufacturing pro-
cess is entirely based on imported materials
and machinery while importation of the article
is firmly and effectively shut out by controls.
Under such conditions, the early experience of
the new manufacturers is most likely to be most
gratifying. It is this phase of import substi-
tution that gives rise to the often noted ex-
67
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uberance and boom atmosphere during which de-
mand is easily overestimated „ . the "ex-
uberant" phase of import substitution was
accompanied by flambuoyant public policies
which badly overestimated the tolerance of the
economy . .69
Once the initial stage has passed and the consumer-
goods substitution phase has been succeeded by a predominantly
capital and intermediate goods phase, three forces tend to
close in on the workability of the process according to the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America studies:
o o o,The import mix shifts predominantly to
one of fuels, industrial materials, essential
foodstuffs, and capital goods required by the
industrial sector. The capital intensity of
import-substituting projects rises, resulting
in a rising import content of investment and
causing the level of investment to be more
severely constrained by the capacity to import
„
The projects tend to require increasingly large
markets in order to reach minimum efficient




weakened by the thin domestic markets of even
the larger Latin American countries «°
Thus , the process of import substitution seems to be
characterized by two sharply contrasting phases—an initial
"easy" phase of rapid consumer good replacement growth and
profits followed by a secondary "steady-state" phase of in-
termediate and capital goods replacement with slow growth,
capital import dependence, and impending foreign exchange
shortages due to neglect of traditional export sectors. This
69^Albert 0. Hirschman, o£. cit
.
, 11-12
David Felix, "The Dilemma of Import Substitution--
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has occurred in the case of the "stop-go" cycles which have
plagued the Argentine economy since the end of their "easy"
phase during the late 1940' s.
Be THE LEGACY OF IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION
1. The Domestic Industrial Sector
Import substitution has encouraged the development of
industrial sectors within developing nations, but not without
initial difficulties
:
In the past two decades, many developing
countries have made investments in new indus-
tries and the infrastructure needed to support
them. Often started in an environment that was
socially, culturally, and economically unaccus-
tomed to manufacturing activity, these indus-
tries have, at least in the initial phase, been
unable to compete with industry in the developed
countries „o o <> High manufacturing costs put
the developing countries at a disadvantage in
competing with more developed countries and in
getting the most goods produced for their in-
ves tment „
'
Thus, as in the Argentine case, social and cultural
factors may inhibit industrial activity through the lack of
experience with manufacturing processes. With these, the
economic costs encountered by any industry initially attempting
to enter an established market are experienced. These include
start-up costs, beyond initial fixed construction costs, pro-
duction costs due to the demand conditions of both the
domestic and international markets, and poorly planned
71Barend A. deVries , "High Cost of Industry in Develop-
ing Countries --Causes and Remedies," in Finance and Develop-
ment
, VI, (December 1969), 43.
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governmental interference with the industrial structures.
Start-up costs are incurred after the construction of the
plant during the "learning" phase of production. Costs are
involved in the training of workers and managers, the start-up
of operations and getting production volume up to capacity,
adapting imitative processes to local conditions, and the
development of supply and distribution channels » Often in
excess of fixed plant costs, the start-up costs generally
72
require special financing arrangements
„
After the initial start-up phase, the plant T s level of
production may affect operating costs in either of two ways -
the plant may be too small to utilize economies of scale bene-
fits in its production process, or domestic demand for its
products may be less than an efficient level of production
output. If it is too small, costs are imposed through ineffi-
cient production techniques and loss of revenues from foregone
sales due to the lack of plant capacity. If domestic demand
for its products is insufficient to meet an efficient level
of output, in the absence of export markets costs are imposed
in the form of unused capital equipment and plant capacity.; as
73
well as unsold inventory levels. Thus, the plant management
is placed in the difficult position of designing a plant with
enough capacity for efficient production, but not so much as
72
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to far overshoot domestic demand Levels for their products.
Governmental interferences can create industrial costs
through alterations of efficient industrial structure and pro-
duction input procurement. Structural stress on autarky—a-
cross-the-board promotion of vertically integrated industries
with no thought to comparative advantage or the effects of the
simultaneous start-up of final, intermediate, and capital
goods industries--leads to the development of inefficient and
high cost industries given the small markets, limited capital,
and lack of skilled manpower. Policies of heavy protection
to initial industries tend to confine the domestic producers
to the home market, thereby inhibiting the exploitation of
economies of scale » Governmental promotion of many firms to
increase competition compounds the structural problems , within
an industry by creating a market of too many small, inefficient
firms unable to utilize economies of scale or existing
74
capacity due to the lack of market demand.
Finally, governmental policies often require each
producer to use domestically produced inputs in a certain per-
centage of their ouput, thereby forcing industry to use often-
inferior, expensive domestic inputs in place of cheaper, better
quality imports without having undertaken sufficient investi-
75
gation of industrial cost structures.
74Werner Baer, "Import Substitution and Industrialization
in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations," in
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Therefore, the initial build-up of industrial capacity
brought about by the process of import substitution has con-
tributed to the developmental problems of the implementing
countries both because of economic production handicaps faced
by almost all new industries as well as short-sighted, poorly
implemented governmental policies which impede the develop-
ment of efficient industrial structure and input procurement.
This is evidenced in the Argentine automobile and
heavy electrical equipment manufacturing industries, where basic
materials considered standard stock in most developed countries
must be purchased in small batches through special orders to
domestic suppliers,, • Further, the lack of uniformity in semi-
finished goods such as forgings and castings creates special
problems in milling and machining parts to required specifi-
cations o As a result, the Argentine automotive industry's
factory costs vary from 60 to 130 percent higher than those in
the United States. Similarly, prices in the heavy electrical
equipment industry are driven up by the excessive diversifi-
cation, unused capacity, and import controls promoted by
76
governmental interference.
2 o Protection Effects
As a complementary policy to the establishment of an
industrial sector through import substitution, the governments
of the implementing nations generally develop extensive pro-
tection policies designed to shelter the new domestic industry
7 f>
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production-possibilities curve is based on positive exter-
nalities gained during their learning stage--benefits from
"learning by doing" --optimal government action should be to
subsidize this learning process, for the following reason:
1) subsidies avoid the consumption costs placed on society
by higher prices of imported goods due to tariff taxes or
supply restriction from quotas; 2) subsidies avoid the pro-
duction costs of protection due to misallocation of resources
occurring from a domestic industrial monopoly in import-
competing goods; 3) subsidies allow the government to ensure
that any positive externalities gained by industry during its
learning phase are shared freely among all producers for their
mutual benefit; and 4) from a welfare economics standpoint,
a policy which directly corrects the distortion in question
is preferred to one which corrects one distortion through
78
the creation of another.
The case against protection and for subsidies may be
graphically presented, as in Figure 6 on the following page.
The diagram depicts the demand and supply conditions of a
good which is obtainable at price P through importation, and
is produced domestically subject to a distortion (i.e., the
learning costs of new industry) which makes the domestic cost
of production and the supply curve S"-S" of domestically pro-
duced goods higher than the undistorted supply curve S-S by a
proportion d of the undistorted conditions. It is assumed that
7 8Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi , op_. cit « , lA-1-14:
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there is only one distortion in the economy.
Under free trade conditions and in the absence of
governmental intervention the economy produces Oq and imports
q q amounts of the good. It could replace q q of imports
by additional domestic production, thereby saving real costs
equal to the area A, which represents the reduction of real
income below the attainable maximum due to distortion. In
order to achieve this result, the government should give a
subsidy on production at the rate of d, the proportional
excess of domestic production costs over the social cost of
production. If instead the government levies a tariff on
imports at the rate of d, it will obtain the cost saving
represented by A, but will also restrict total consumption due
to the higher price of the product, (l+d)P or the original
f
free trade price multiplied by the tariff rate. This will
entail a loss of consumer surplus equal to the area B, The
loss of consumer surplus will be greater than the cost saving
of increased domestic output if the demand curve is fairly
elastic and the supply curve is fairly inelastic (area A smaller
81
than area B), and vice versa. In any case, the imposition
of a tariff imposes some degree of consumption cost and price
distortion. Policies which are encouraged by the import substi-
tution process may be better employed for government
80







subsidization of the initial learning period of infant
industries. Unfortunately, too many developing countries
apply indiscriminate policies of protection as much for
political convenience as for economic gain. Argentine pro-
tection regulations, listed in Appendix D, are typically
selective in nature, allowing only goods necessary for the
economic improvement of the country in without a surcharge
or quota. Also, they require that all governmental agencies,
government -owned enterprises, and all parties involved in
government contracts, public works, or services purchase
domestic materials if their price is "reasonable" (i.e., not
higher than foreign goods after all surcharges, shipping costs,





3 . Export Sector Neglect
The effect on the traditional export sector of import
substitution and industrialization generally has been detri-
mental, as stated below:
Policies employed to stimulate industries
have often been prejudicial to the functioning
of the more traditional agricultural sector.
The allocation of investment resources (credit)
to new industries has often meant that a few
resources were avilable to increase agricultural
efficiency. Overvalued exchange rates, which
favored industries by providing cheap imported
inputs , hurt agriculture by making its goods
less competitive on the international market
and/or by making it less profitable to export
agricultural products. Finally, the combination
of higher industrial prices caused by protection
O o
A Statement of the Laws of Argentina in Matters ' I ' cting
Business
,
(Washington: Pan American Union, 1963), 36-^
48

and by price control of agricultural goods,
turned the internal terms of trade against
agriculture . . . Argentina is probably the
outstanding example of import substitution
occurring to the detriment of agriculture and
agricultural exports. -^
The importance of exports to the economy of a developing
nation is described below by the Pearson Commission on Inter-
national Development:
The importance of exports for the develop-
ment of the poorer countries can hardly be
overestimated o They are by far the most impor-
tant source of foreign exchange. In recent
years they have been nearly four times as large
as the flow of aid and private investment » . •
Clearly, the willingness of a country to adopt
policies aimed at stimulating exports is a key
indication of how seriously it seeks self -sus-
tained growtho
Within the framework of import substitution and
industrialization, the expansion of exports provides the foreign
exchange. resources to pay for the intermediate and capital
commodities imports necessary for industrial development,
as well as payments on foreign debts incurred by the industrial
85
sector. Thus, to neglect the export sector is to fore-
shadow the curtailment of industrial development, as has
occurred repeatedly in Argentina.
The export position of a nation with respect to the
international market is dependent on its export community mix
83
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and its share relative to the world market. Basically, exports
may be divided into two classes of export commodities
:
1) major commodities, characterized by well-organized markets
dominated by a few suppliers; and 2) minor commodities,
characterized by their miscellaneous mixture of agricultural,
mineral, and manufactured commodities with many market parti-
cipants.
86
A nation's export position with respect to co^odity
mix, therefore, is generally dependent on the performance of
the above two export classes relative to each other. A
fifteen year study has brought out four factors about their
relative performance: 1) countries which had small market
shares at the beginning of the study tended to show a better
performance in major commodities throughout the period; 2)
countries with stable price structures experienced more growth
of minor, exports than those with inflationary problems; 3)
performance in both major and minor commodities appeared
positively related to favorable growth in agricultural
production; and 4) countries with relatively rapid increases
in manufacturing production tended to achieve better minor
87
export performance. (See Appendix E for expanded export
performance figures, Table I)
National export position with respect to market share
is directly related to the elasticity of export supply with
reference to domestic demand for the exported commodity, and
86
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inversely related to the country's share in the world market
o o
for that commodity „ Therefore, countries with the best
export performance are characterized by a combination of small
shares in the major commodity markets, emphasis on agricultural
production, light rather than heavy and integrated industriali-
89
zation, and domestic policies favoring price stability.
Argentina is classified among the few countries which have
large domestic markets and exports diversified to the point
at which they have no dominant shares of the world commodity
markets. Ideally, any country in this position should have
several options for economic development policies --their
small trade positions enhance their export opportunities,
and their relatively large domestic markets widening the
range of industrial products in which they can develop a
90
competitive advantage.
Unfortunately, the export performance of Argentina
during the last two decades has not been up to potential. The
neglect of the agricultural sector during the drive for
industrialization along with increasing domestic consumption
of key agricultural export commodities have tended to keep
exports of those commodities from increasing at a substantial
rate, as shown in Appendix E, Table II
„
go
See Appendix F for a further discussion of the
elasticities.
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4. The Foreign Exchange Constraint
The foreign exchange difficulties experienced by
Argentina and other developing countries .nay be described as
below:
The major external constraint may be
summed up as the availability of foreign
exchange. Foreign exchange is a crucial
resource in development planning. All develop-
ing countries are forced to rely on imported
raw materials and spare parts without which
their own resources cannot be pressed into
service o The developing countries face problems
both in increasing their earnings of foreign
exchange and in the increasing claims on avail-
able foreign exchange of rising debt payments
and other essential commitments.^
The foreign exchange constraint cycle has been analyzed
by Professor Meier. This analysis, using Figure 2 on the
next page, is as follows. In the figure, Y equals national
income, X equals exports, M equals imports, I equals investment,
and S equals savings. The export function X is represented
as autonomous with respect to national income, as it is
assumed that the country's quantity of imports is too small
to have an effect on the income of foreign countries to which
the country exports. M, I, and S are considered to be dependent
on Y. The intersection of I+X = S+M denotes the equilibrium
level of income OY with a balanced foreign exchange account
at Q„ If the country embarks on a development program which





The Foreign Exchange Constraint
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Y„ -. —
I+X I ' +X
X, M, I+X, S+M
Figure 2.
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increases the level of investment from I to I 1 , the I+X curve
shifts to I f +X and national income rises to OY (the "go" part
of the Argentine cycle). However, there also appears a
balance of payments deficit of A-B , thereby providing a con-
straint to further development and initiating the "stop" part
of the cycle. This constraint occurs whenever imports exceed
exports , thus even if development had begun at the surplus
point of 0Y 9 , the economy could only expand to OY before
being constrained.
If exports were expanded and the X curve were to shift
over and ease the balance of payments situation, the rise in
exports would tend to lag the rise in investment, thus the I+X
curve would move more rapidly than the X curve alone. The
more investment which goes to non-export sectors , the more in-
elastic is the supply of exports, and the more domestic con-
9k
sumption of export commodities rises as income increases.,
The cycle of periodic Argentine foreign exchange
shortages (the "stop-go" cycle) has been a manifestation of
the above analysis for the past 23 years. Each new period
of industrial expansion is marked by a heavy propensity to
import needed materials at a demand elasticity for imported
goods of about three. Thus, increases in the Argentine
national income are three times as likely to be spent on
imported goods as average income, with little hope that changes






in relative prices through devaluation or quantitative
restrictions can reduce the level of imports substantially
in the short run.
The increase in imports puts pressure on the balance
of payments and foreign exchange situation. With the export
sector being predominantly agricultural with a slow rate of
growth (Appendix E, Table II), foreign exchange surplus, if
any, soon disappears and the government is forced to devalue
its currency, with the following results:
One of the main reasons that exchange
-
policy management has proven so difficult in
practice is that .00 Argentina exports mostly
domestic wage goods: principally meat, grains,
fresh fruit, textile fibers, and leather » Its
imports, however, are chiefly raw materials,
intermediate products , and capital goods . . •
most of which are essential for maintaining or
expanding the level of economic activity. Ex-
change rate adjustments, therefore, have an
immediate impact on the general cost of living.
Such adjustments generate pressure from the
country's strongly organized labor unions for
wage increases, and these increases, together
with the rise in other costs
,
quickly tend to
be passed on in the form of higher prices by
the strongly cartelized producers. "
Thus, increased importation and industrial growth bring
higher wages which decrease export capacity; all of which
create a foreign exchange deficit which brings about devaluation
which creates a recession and inflation, and so on through
each "stop-go" economic cycle Tables III through VI in
95Carlos F. Diaz-Ale jandro , Essays on the Argentine
Economy
, (New Haven: Economic Growth Center, 1967), 17.
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Appendix E show the patterns of change in the exchange rate
of the Argentine peso with respect to the U. S. dollar; the
movement of real and nominal industrial wage rates; variations
in the consumer price index; and a comparison of the percentage
changes in the gross domestic product and the cost of living
from year to year. The above statistics trace the effects
of the "stop-go" foreign exchange cycle phenomenon as it has
occurred during the past decade under conditions of fixed
world-wide exchange rate policies
.
C o SUMMARY
Throughout this chapter, the developmental pattern of
Argentina has been discussed with respect to the economic
relationships behind some of the policies employed. During
its initial, export-dependent phase, the theory of comparative
advantage combined with equilibrium analysis may be employed
to describe and analyze movements of the specialized inter-
national market structure characteristic of that period e Both
the primary good exporting nations such as Argentina and the
industrializing nations of Europe were able to gain in welfare
from the specialization of production and trade according to
their comparative advantage.
With the coming of the world-wide Depression of the 1930 f s,
the specialized international structure collapsed, and
Argentina began a program of domestic industrialization through
import substitution,. Characterized by the replacement of
imported goods with domestic ones, several structural cha iges
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occurred in the Argentine economy, including rapid industri-
alization at the expense of the traditional export sector
and excessive governmental interference in the market structure
and procurement policies of the new indus tries
The cumulative result of the export neglect, industrialization,
and interference has been a continual pattern of "stop-go"
cycles characterized by industrial growth and import increases
which create foreign exchange crises, devaluation, and domestic
price inflation,. Due to the economic and political instability
created by these cycles, any governmental policies implemented
generally result in either a new wave of recession and inflation,
or a change in government. Thus, due to the original short-
sighted, haphazard implementation of the industrialization




IV. A MODEL OF ARGENTINE SELF-SUFFICIENCY
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Background
As discussed in the preceding chapters , the eventual
goal of Argentine economic development, in the absence of
freely floating rates of exchange, is a state of domestic
self-sufficiency, where the majority of inputs needed in the
production sector of the economy will be supplied by domestic
sources rather than imports, and where those inputs which can-
not be replaced by domestic sources will be paid for by a
sufficient amount of domestic export products so as to avoid
a foreign exchange deficit. As shown, the actual state of
the Argentine economy is far from a self-sufficient state, but
the construction of a hypothetical model depicting the pro-
duction structure that Argentina would have to maintain at
such a level is instructive in several ways. According to
Dr. Leontief , who originally constructed such a model for
Israel, the model shows how far a nation falls short of being
a self-sufficient industrial economy, in which sectors it is
weakest, and in what sectors it can push its development i;most
97
fruitfully."
Therefore, a model of hypothetical Argentine self-
sufficiency may serve as a starting point for the reconstruction
97Wassily Leontief, Input -Output Economic s , (New Yorl
Oxford University Press, iy66) ,53.
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of a path of development from the cyclical instability
experienced at present.
2. Input-Output Analysis
The data which enables the construction of a self-
sufficiency model is derived from input-output analysis
techniques and a national input-output table for Argentina.
Basically, input-output analysis groups the intersectoral
transactions of an economy with regard to production, consump-
tion, transportation, and distribution in a tabular matrix
as shown in Figure 3 on the following page The horizontal
rows of the matrix (x.) show how the output of each sector of
the economy is distributed among the other sectors (i.e., 20
units of agricultural output are used in manufacturing),
while the vertical columns (x .) show how each sector obtains
3
its needed inputs from the other sectors (i.e., agriculture
98
needs 14 units of manufacturing sector inputs).
The typical row of an input-output table may be
represented as below:
x. = (x. . + x. . ) + D. (1)
x. equals the gross sectoral output of sector i; D^ equals the
final demand for the product of sector i; and x- * and x. .LJ 1 1 J2
represent the intermediate uses of the output of sector i in
99
sectors j. and i respectively,,





Chiou-shuang Yan, Introduction to Input-Ouput Econc lies
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Sector 1 Sector 2 Final Total
Agriculture Manufacturers demand output
25 20 55 100
14 6 30 50
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Each column of the input-output matrix represents the
input structure of a sector, as below:
x. .
1-3 J
x equals the total input structure of sector j while x. .,
J H J




The matrix of technical input-output coefficients, as
shown in Figure 4, displays the ratio between each input to
a sector and the total output of that sector. If a. . equals
the technical coefficient, indicating the amount of product i
103
needed to produce one unit of product j, then:
a., = thL. (3)
3. The Argentine Input-Output Tables
Argentina has been computing input-output tables of
its economy since 1946, with the one used in this study based
on the year 1960 o Aggregated to 28 sectors from an original
200 sectors, the 1960 table is basically an updated version
10'!
of a 1953 table compiled by the Central Bank of Argentina.
102Chiou-shuang Yan, op_. cit <, , 16.
Ibid .
Actualization de la Matriz de Insumo-Producto del Ano
1953 al Ano 1960
,
(Buenos Aires : Secretaria del Gonsejo Nacional
de Desarrollo, 1968), 22.
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The table of input coefficients used was likewise computed
from an updated version of the 1953 input-output table (See
Appendix G). The method used by the Argentine National Develop-
ment Council to transform the entries from 1953 to 1960 terms
was basically to multiply the monetary input coefficients of
1953 by the ratio of the price indices of 1960 to 1953 for
each sector. This method assumes that the input coefficients
for 1953 and 1960 in real terms remained equal, as shown below:
60 53 I. 60/53
a. . = a. . _Ei (4)





rnaij - aij < 5 >
a. . equals the input coefficient in monetary terms, a- • equals
the input coefficient in real terms , and I . and I equal
pi
the price indices for goods i and j respectively.
P1 PJ 105
B„ THE MODEL OF ARGENTINE SELF-SUFFICIENCY
1. Input Coefficient Stability Over Time
For the purposes of this model, the input-coefficient
matrix for 1960 has been assumed to be applicable in 1972 for
the following reasons: 1) a more recent input-output table
for the Argentine economy was not available; 2) as shown in
Table III on the following page, the percentage distribution
of the sectoral share of the gross domestic product has been

































1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
20.0 17„5 15.5 15.5 14.4 14.5
1 2 1„3 1.7 1„8 1.8 1.8
31.5 33.8 32.6 31.2 31.0 30.7
3.8 4.0 4.5 5.2 5.6 6.2
1.7 2„0 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.9
8.1 7.9 9.0 9.3 9.8 9.6
13.6 13.9 13.3 12.8 13.3 13.8
4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.5
4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.5 4.5
9 o 9.7 10 o 9 10.9 10.0 9.6
7.0 6.4 6„2 6.5 6.6 6.4
106America En Cifras 1970 : Situacion Economic a: 4.
Balanza de Pagos
, op. cit ."j 5~4.
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fairly constant, with no sector gaining or Losing a signifi-
cant share of the Argentine gross domestic product (i.e.,
over 6%) ; 3) a study by the Norwegian Central Bureau of
Statistics on the stability of input coefficients concludes
that a movement from less to more aggregation tends to reduce
107
the standard deviation about an average coefficient over time.
Thus, the lack of current data plus the stabilizing effects
of the lack of sectoral percentage fluctuations and aggregation
allow the use of the 1960 input coefficients in a 1972
context.
2. Calculation of Revised Sectoral Final Demand
In order to make the level of self-sufficiency more
realistic in terms of actual Argentine GNP growth from 1960
to 1972, the final demand quantities as calculated per sector
in the 1960 input-output table (see Appendix G, Table I) were
revised in the following manner: 1) the percentage change in
GNP growth rate for Argentina from 1961 to 1969 (adjusted to
a base of 1963 = 100 to allow for yearly price level changes)
was calculated on a yearly basis and a simple average taken,
equalling 3 percent per year; 2) this calculation was co pared
to another similar calculation based on different data sources
108
and found to be compatible; 3) using the following formula
Per Sevaldson, "The Stability of Input-Ouput Coeffi-
cients," International Conference on Input-Output Techniques
,









, 32. Check data from Merkx , go. cit. , 1
6k

based on that for the calculation of compound interest:




where F equals revised final demand, D equals original sec-
toral final demand, g equals the average yearly growth rate
of 3 percent (assumed to apply uniformly to each sector), and
n equals the 13 year period from 1960 to 1972, each revised
final sectoral demand figure was calculated, as listed in
109
Table IV on the following page,,
3« The Self-Sufficiency Model for Demand Structure
Using the revised final demand figures for each sector
and the 1960 input-coefficient matrix as shown in Table II,
Appendix G, the final demand structure for self-sufficiency
was calculated, as shown in Figure 5. Based on Leontief's
original format, the horizontal axis measures total sectoral
output in units of Argentine pesos, while the vertical axis
measures the percentage of self-sufficiency attained by each
sector o The level of desired self-sufficiency (100% level
in Figure 5) is assumed to be the 1972 level of domestic
demand, with all sectoral blocks scaled to the same height.
Imports are subtracted from the 100% level as a percentage
of total sectoral demand (as determined from the sectoral
input coefficient for imports). Exports are added to the
total sectoral self-sufficiency level as a percentage of
surplus demand, as determined from the ratio of exports to
total demand output based on the 1960 input-output table and
109
The 37o compound interest coefficient 1.4685 was u 1




Revised Final Sectoral Demand
(1,000,000 pesos)



















































































































































































































































































































































the assumption that yearly sectoral exports also grew at a
rate of three percent «,
The usefulness of such a structural format may be seen
from both a static and comparative standpoint. Statically,
the model format allows one to observe the relative shares of
total output held by each sector of the economy; the foreign
exchange position of each sector (i.e. , the export-import
balance); the import dependence and export performance of each
sector; and the percentage of final domestic and export
demand supplied by each sector.
Comparatively, the structure of the model allows pre-
dictions of changes in direct and indirect outputs and inputs
required from each sector for a given change in exports,
imports, or total domestic demand. Using the input-coefficient
matrix, changes in direct demand for any sector may be broken
down into the indirect demand from other sectors needed to
supply the increased level of demand from the original sector.
For example, using the Argentine 1960 input -coefficient
matrix, the indirect input demands generated by the direct
additional demand of 1000 pesos on the first eight sectors are
shown in Table V on the following page.
The summation of all of the direct and indirect demands
generated by any level of final demand on each sector deter-
mines the size of the sector modules within the model struc-
ture. Thus, the self-sufficiency model may be adapted to
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by showing the changes in the static relationships for changes
in demand conditions. The direct and indirect effects of
import substitution in any one sector on all of the other
sector may be observed <>
Thus, while limited by the accuracy and structure of
the basic input -output tables used and the lack of recent data,
the self-sufficiency model outlined above definitely demon-
strates its usefulness as a tool in any program of develop-
mental planning or reorganization. The static and dynamic
effects of industrialization, protection, and other developmental
problems may be projected and evaluated on a sectoral basis,
thereby reducing some of the vagueness and uncertainty




The economic development of Argentina has, since the mid-
nineteenth century, followed a pattern composed of three phases.
The initial phase lasted from the 1850' s through 1929, when
Argentine development was characterized by a dependence on
its agricultural exports to industrial Europe following the
dictates of comparative advantage. Politically controlled by
the elite class of agricultural landowners, most economic
policies of the government encouraged export growth in return
for imports of consumer and capital goods . Such policies
,
while contributing to the development of the interior and
increasing the population through immigration, precluded
domestic industrial development. Similarly, the land tenure
system blocked immigrants from land ownership, thus urbanization
occurred without an industrial base or social system from
which to develop a stable urban populace. The extreme ex-
ternal dependence of the first phase led to foreign exchange
difficulties in the presence of a system of fixed world -wide
exchange rates. Thus, the stability of the domestic economy
of Argentina became dependent upon the stability of the
European business cycle and the international market.
The world-wide depression of the 1930' s introduced the
second phase of Argentine economic development--industrializat ion
through import substitution. This phase lasted through
World War II until the middle of the Peron regime in the arly
76

1950'so Brought about by the drop in external demand for
Argentine exports, the industrialization phase removed the
emphasis from agricultural export growth to domestic industrial
growth, almost to the point of complete agricultural stagnation,
Domestic industry was established in an atmosphere of
governmental protection and controls, thus promoting ineffi-
cient industrial resource allocation. This inefficiency became
evident when the extreme dependence of the industries on
imports of intermediate and capital goods forced a shortage
of foreign exchange due to the inability of the agricultural
export sector to keep pace with the industrial imports. In-
dustrial growth halted, domestic inflation and labor unrest
occurred, and a recession resulted until the foreign exchange
problems were settled,, Thus, while the second phase helped to
industrialize Argentina, it also introduced the characterisitc
"stop-go" growth cycle brought about by export stagnation
and industrial import dependence.
The third phase, still in evidence today, began with the
advent of the above "stop-go" cycles in the early 1950' s.
Political pressures from both labor and the military have
called for domestic stability, economic growth, and general
properity. Such pressures, in combination with the slow
recovery of the Argentine export sector and the import depen-
dence of the industrial sector have defeated most attempts
of the government to effectively control the cyclical economic
problems. Thus, the third phase may be considered the result
of the previous phases --domes tic dependence on the exter .1
sector, export weakness, and inefficient industrial struLCure.
11

In my opinion, it will take much time and effort for
Argentina to resolve its economic problems. The present
situation is the cumulative result of economic and political
policies enacted over a period of many years in a complex
pattern of vested interests, idealistic goals, and economic
rationale o Such complexities are not easily solved and must
be approached from a logical, factual, and rational perspective,
A model such as that described in Chapter IV provides a solid
platform from which to begin » Once the strengths and weak-
nesses of each economic sector have been determined, then
positive actions in both the political and economic spheres
of the nation may be taken in a planned, coordinated manner.
Given an idea of the national repercussions which might result
from actions in a single economic sector, governmental leaders
may move in a more cautious manner, taking into account both
the short and the long run effects of seemingly expedient
actions
•
Argentina today is not hopelessly entangled in develop-
mental stagnation. Its population growth rate is controlled,
its education level is above the Latin American average, its
middle class is well established, and much of its interior is
not yet developed With a determined national effort, Argen-
tina can free itself of its cyclical crises and attain relative
domestic stability and national growth. However, the effort
will demand time, coordination, and cooperation from all
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948 1013 - 65
974 908 66
1005 1025 - 20
Table III.
Argentina: Foreign Trade Exchange Rate
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An Expansion of Comparative Advantage Analysis
As noted in Chapter III, the economic development pattern
of Argentina during its initial phase from the 1850' s to 1929
followed the principles of comparative advantage. The
principle of comparative advantage may be illustrated as
follows. Assume two countries, A and B, each capable of pro-
ducing two commodities, X and M domestically. As shown in
Figure 6 on the following page, country A is better suited to
produce commodity X due to its factor endowments, and country
B is better suited to produce commodity M. This is shown
by their respective production-possibilities curves--P -P
a a
for country A and P -P for country B. Given equal demand
b b
conditions in each country, the community indifference curves
for each country are assumed to be equal. Thus, due to the
difference in factor endowments, each nation has a comparative
advantage in one commodity with regard to the other, and both
114
countries may benefit from trade.
Realizing that they have a comparative advantage due to
their differing commodity price ratios (the slope of N-N' for
A and R-R' for B), each nation moves along its production-
possibilities curve in the direction of more specializaation in
114
Mordechai E. Kreinin, International Economics, (Nc
York: Harcourt Brace JovanoviclTJ Inc., 1971), 2T2-214.
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the advantageous commodity (A from E to E* and B from F to
F') Post-trade equilibrium finds each nation consuming at
a higher Level of consumer utility (from I, to I2 in each
case), each importing whatever the other exports as shown by
the braces in Figure 6, Thus, A produces at point E' and
consumes at point G., while country B consumes at C and pro-
duces at F'. Trade, therefore, has allowed each nation to
expand beyond its domestic pre-trade point of equilibrium and
enabled the community to consume at a higher level of satis-
faction while specializing in the production of that commodity





Excerpts from Argentine Protection Laws
1. Legislation and General Provisions
The general provisions relating to the promotion of
Argentine industry are contained in . . „ which authorizes the
executive branch to grant special benefits and privileges to
new industries installed in the country or to those already
installed that undertake expansion programs
„
2. Industrial Development by Sectors and Regions
The sectors of industry to be promoted throughout the
country are the following: steel, the petrochemical industry,
cellulose, building materials, and mining industries.
The sectors to be promoted in certain zones ... are
those which make use of raw materials originating in those
zones and which contribute to the increase in exports of
domestic manufactured products or which replace intermediary
products
.
3. Free Entry of Equipment
Decrees . » o regulate the entry of machinery intended
to re-equip Argentine industry. The first decree provides
for the entry, exempt from exchange surcharges . . „ if the
project meets the following requirements: a) that it will
mean a greater utilization of domestic raw materials or semi-
processed articles; . o • b) that it should benefit the
balance of trade by replacing imports or developing new exports;
c) that it will benefit the foreign exchange balance • • •
4o Preference for Argentine Products
. e . the national government and government -owned enter rises
must purchase domestic materials if the price is reasonable
• o o The cost of materials and products of domestic origin
will be considered reasonable if it is not higher than the
cost of foreign articles which o • . include the following
elements: a) the C.I.Fo value at an Argentine port; b) the
current exchange surcharge; c) the taxes, excises, customs,
duties, etc. that would be paid by an importer without
115A S tatement of the Laws Affecting Argentina, on. c t.,
35-41. B £ -"
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privileges; d) the interest, commissions, and financing
charges that a purchaser would pay if payment on time had
been offered • . .; e) the income tax imposed on interest
remitted abroad if chargeable to the purchaser.
5, Imports
Imports are free of import and exchange licensing ...
all imports except those from member countries of LAFTA are
subject to a special tax of 5 percent • • For import pur-
poses, commodities are grouped in lists by the Central Bank
according to their essentiality in local production,, Sur-
charges of 20%, 40%, 80%, 100%, 150% and 200% are established













1957 974.8 1310.4 -335.6
1958 993.9 1232.6 -238.7
1959 1009.0 993.0 16.0
1960 1079o2 1249.3 -170.1
1961 964.1 1460.4 -496.3
1962 1216o0 1356.5 -140.5
1963 1365.1 980.7 384.4
1964 1410.4 1077.2 333.2
1965 1493.4 1198.6 294.9
1966 1593.2 1124.3 468.9
1967 14641.5 1095.5 369.0
1968 1367.9 1169.2 198.7
1969 1611.0 1556 o 55.0
(In millions of $ U. S.)
Table II.
Argentina: Output of Principal Agricultural
Commodities, 1960/61 and 1966/67-1968/69
117
Commodity 1960-61 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69
Wheat 4200.0 6247.0 7320.0 5740.0
Maize 4850.0 8510.0 6560.0 6860.0
Linseed 562.0 577.0 385.0 570.0
Oats 843.0 540.0 690.0 490.0
Alfalfa 6453.0 6214.0 5404.0 6165.0
Sugar Cane 9650.0 8576.0 9500.0 9800.0
Wine Grapes 2082.9 3485.9 2455.8 2013.8
Beef Cattle 2145.1 2522.0 2545.8 2835.0
(Thousands of Tons)
116America En Cifras , 197 : Situacion Economica : 3 Com -
mnic a c iones
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Organization of American Sta'tes, i'970), 127
ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America
,
(New York:



















Movement of Industrial Wages
(1960 = 100)
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An Expansion of Export Supply Elasticity
As stated in Chapter III, national export position with
respect to market share is directly related to the elasticity
of export supply with respect to domestic demand for the ex-
ported commodity, and inversely related to the country's share
in the world market for the export commodity. Initially, the
volume of exports may be defined as the difference between the
quantity of the commodity supplied domestically and the quan-
tity demanded domestically. If Q equals the export supply,
Q euqals the domestic supply of the exported commodity, and
s
Q equals the domestic demand for the export commodity, then:
Qx = Qs - Qd (6)
The definition of the elasticity of demand for the export
commodity equals the price of the commodity divided by the
quantity of the commodity multiplied by the change in
quantity of the commodity divided by the change in price of





x Qx dPx (7)
E equals the demand elasticity for the export commodity, and
122
P equals the price of the commodity.
122James M. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt , Microec onomic
Theory
,
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1971), 27.
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From the above definition of elasticity, the export supply
123




£x A9X . gx . A(QS -Qd ) . Px AQg . Pv ,AQd (8)
«x ^
p
x A P APX >x ^ px
Multiplying and dividing the first term by Q and the second
s












AP, _ e. _ ed . Qd(9)
cx :x X
Once the supply of the export commodity is determined,
its share of the world market is inversely proportional to
the world elasticity of demand for the commodity. If W equals
the world demand for a given product and G equals the amount
of the commodity exported by one country. If N equals the





















* Px W-G APX
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N = W(-Px/W) (AW/APy ) + C(Px/C) (A C/A Px ) (11)
x W-C W-C
W . NT + C . e (12)w ———— cW-G W-G
Thus, the world's elasticity of demand for the exports
of a country is equal to the ratio of the total world demand
for the commodity to the export supply of that commodity from
the country multiplied by the total world elasticity of demand
for that commodity (N ) plus the ratio of the exports of that
w
commodity from all other suppliers to the export supply of
the commodity from the country in question multiplied by the
elasticity of export supply from the rest of the world (e ).
This implies that even if the total demand for a certain
commodity is inelastic, the demand for one nation's exports of
that commodity may be highly elastic if it has only a small





Translation of Sectors Represented
in the Matrix of Technical Input Coefficients
Title of Table I: Matrix of Intersectoral Transactions of
National Goods and Imports
Title of Table II: Matrix of Technical Coefficients of Inputs







5. Fuel and Electricity




















20 o Vehicles and Machinery









Input-Output tables taken from Actualization de la
Matriz de Insumo-Producto





28. Other Services •
II. Imported Goods
IIIo Factors of Production: Gross Value Added at
Market Prices
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This paper analyzes the pattern of Argentine economic
development from the mid-nineteenth century until the present
day. Initially, an overview of the Argentine developmental
experience is given, emphasizing the three general phases of
Argentine economic development - 1) agricultural export
dominance, 2) industrialization through import substitution,
and 3) the present state of cyclical economic crises and
domestic instability. Secondly, the phases of development
are examined from an economic viewpoint to determine their
cumulative effects upon the Argentine economic structure.
Finally, a model of Argentine "self-sufficiency" based on
input-output analysis is presented as a point of departure
for future developmental planning.
The results of the analysis point out the basic problems
behind the present-day Argentine developmental structure and
demonstrate the interactions of the various phases in their
contribution to the existing cyclical instability. The model
demonstrates a logical method for future sectoral analysis.
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